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Abstract—With the exponential growth of devices connected to
the Internet, security networks as one of the hardest challenge
for network managers. Maintaining and securing such large
scale and heterogeneous network is a challenging task. In this
context, the new networking paradigm, the Software Deﬁned
Networking (SDN), introduces many opportunities and provides
the potential to overcome those challenges. In this article, we
ﬁrst present a new SDN based architecture for networking with
or without infrastructure, that we call an SDN domain. A single
domain includes wired network, wireless network and Ad-Hoc
networks. Next, we propose a second architecture to include
sensor networks in an SDN-based network and in a domain.
Third, we interconnect multiple domains and we describe how we
can enhanced the security of each domain and how to distribute
the security rules in order not to compromise the security of
one domain. Finally, we propose a new secure and distributed
architecture for IoT (Internet of Things).
Index Terms—SDN, Internet of Things (IoT), Ad-Hoc net-
works, Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
The protection of data transmission has been an issue even
long before the creation of the Internet. However, with the
latest Internet evolution, billions of devices will be connecting
to users using both wired and wireless infrastructure. As a re-
sult, it exposes users and network resources to many potential
attacks. A special concern will be dedicated to the security of
the Internet of Things (IoT), since it will include every object
or device with networking capabilities. Objects can include
simple home sensors, medical devices, cars, airplanes and even
nuclear reactors and other things, which can poses risks to
human life.
Traditional security mechanisms like Firewalling, Intrusion
Detection and Prevention Systems are deployed at the Internet
edge. Those mechanisms are used to protect the network from
external attacks. Such mechanisms are no longer enough to
secure the next generation Internet. The borderless architecture
of the IoT raises additional concerns over network access
control and software veriﬁcation.
In Ad-hoc network for IoT does not exist simple solution to
control the exchanges between each node. For instance, if one
thing is corrupted by a virus, this treat can propagate itself
in the network without any control. Moreover, anyone can
connect his things on the network. Details of network access
control implementation based for IoT devices can be found in
[19].
The new networking paradigm, the Software Deﬁned Net-
working (SDN), offers many opportunities to protect the
network in a more efﬁcient and ﬂexible way [1]. In SDN archi-
tectures, network devices do not make forwarding decisions.
Instead of that, network devices communicate with a special
node, called the SDN controller, in order to provide them
with the appropriate forwarding decisions. To communicate
with the Controller, the network devices can use different
protocols. The most used protocol for the communication
between the SDN controller and the network devices is the
OpenFlow [3]. OpenFlow deﬁnes control messages that enable
the SDN controller to establish a secure connection with the
network devices, read their current state, and install forwarding
instructions. Furthermore, OpenFlow provides granular and
ﬂexible trafﬁc management, using twelve ﬁelds in the packets
header to match the network trafﬁc. The ﬂow rules (forwarding
decisions) can be dynamically modiﬁed in order to adapt to
different network changes. Moreover, OpenFlow was initially
developed to enable researches and run experimental proto-
col in the production networks. Afterwards, it was widely
deployed in campus networks, data centers, etc.
In this article, we present a security model for the IoT based
on the SDN architectures. Firstly, the proposed security model
was designed to establish and secure both wired and wireless
network infrastructure. Secondly, we extended the proposed
architecture in order to include Ad-Hoc networks and network
object things such as: sensors, tablets, smart phone, etc. Our
main contributions are as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst effort that
uses the SDN architecture to tackle security issues in the
IoT.
• Inspired by existing Network Access Control and security
techniques, we design a secure SDN-based architecture
for the IoT.
• Based on a Grid of Security paradigm [9], we enhance
security policies exchange and deployment between SDN
control domains.
Our security model is discussed later in this article, and we
conclude with the outline of our vision for the SDN based
security on solutions for the IoT.
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II. THE SOFTWARE DEFINED NETWORK
Software-Deﬁned Networking (SDN) has emerged as a new
paradigm for enabling innovation in networking research and
development. The control and data planes are decoupled,
network intelligence and state are logically centralized. A
new device called controller connects to the switch through
a secured OpenFlow channel and manages this switch via the
OpenFlow protocol.
The controller can add, update, and delete ﬂow entries, both
reactively in response to packets and proactively with pre-
deﬁned rules. Moreover, SDN enables fast reaction to security
threats, granular trafﬁc ﬁltering, and dynamic security policies
deployment.
The SDN architecture provides a programmatic interface
inside the controller. SDN allows that the network control
operations:
• run on top of one or multiple server platforms with higher
performances,
• use vendor independent hardware and an open operating
system,
• are able to communicate with other operating systems or
control platforms using standard protocols.
In terms of security, SDN architecture extends the security
perimeter to the network access end point devices (access
switches, wireless access points, etc.), by pushing security
policies to those devices [2].
After establishing connection with the OpenFlow switches,
the SDN controller builds a global network view based on the
information received via the OpenFlow protocol. Furthermore,
the SDN controller can:
• perform network discovery, using the Link Layer Discov-
ery Protocol (LLDP),
• collect statistics about network trafﬁc using a special ﬁeld
in the ﬂow rules earlier installed by the controller.
A. Simple Point of Failure
Previous works, [10], [11], [12], [13], the authors have
developed framework and security applications for SDN. The
main issue of their works is the presence of a single point
of failure which is the controller. Using only one controller,
a Denial of Service (DoS) can occur. Furthermore, security
threats are another drawback. If an attacker compromises the
SDN controller, then he has full control over the network. So,
with one controller a potential risk exists to the entire network.
In addition hardware and software failures also pose risks to
a single controller system.
A solution using multiple controllers [14] can increase
trustworthiness and fault tolerance. When a controller fails,
another SDN controller can take control to avoid system
failures.
B. Synchronized Multiple Controllers
In an SDN network, switches communicate with their
controller via standard TLS or TCP connections. The Open
Daylight Controller [14] supports a Cluster-based High Avail-
ability model. The controller has a global view of the network,
and it can easily ensure that the network is in optimal con-
dition. There is increased network performance with multiple
controllers, because each controller has a partial view of the
network, and the controllers have to collaborate and exchange
informations with each other. The interaction between the
Controller(s) and the Open-Flow enabled switches is essen-
tially to have one Openﬂow switch multi-homed to multiple
controllers. If one of the controllers goes down, another is
ready to control the switch.
Fig. 1. Equal interaction SDN Networks.
Since version 1.2, Openﬂow specify two modes of operation
when multiple controllers exist in the network:
• Equal interaction (Fig. 1): in this case all controllers have
read/write access to the switch, which means they have
to synchronize in order not to step on each other’s feet.
• Master/Slave interaction: in this case there will be one
master and multiple slaves (there could be still multiple
equals as well)
III. SDN BASED AD-HOC ARCHITECTURE
The equal interaction is the default comportment of a
controller. It has full access to the switch and all controllers
have the same rules. Based on this assumption, we propose
Multiple SDN Controller architecture for Ad-Hoc Networks.
A. SDN architecture for Ad-Hoc Network
In this section, we present an SDN based architecture for
Ad-Hoc Network. We propose that a node in Ad-Hoc networks
can be viewed (Fig. 2) as a combination of
• legacy interfaces : the physical layer,
• programmable layer : SDN compatible virtual switch and
an SDN controller
• operating system and their applications : the OS layer
In this model, all legacy interfaces are connected to a virtual
switch, and this switch is controlled by an SDN controller, in-
tegrated on the node. Since all controllers of each node operate
in equal interaction, they will have no need to be concerned
about nodes liability for the misbehaving users connecting
through them, as in [8]. Ad-Hoc users will connect with other
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Fig. 2. A node in Ad-Hoc network.
nodes through their embedded SDN-compatible switch. At
the same time, the SDN controller, in equal interaction, can
enhance the security and connectivity between the nodes.
One of the advantages of this new SDN based Ad-Hoc
network architecture is its compatibility with SDN legacy
network. Since each node in the Ad-Hoc network has an
embedded SDN-compatible switch and an SDN controller, we
can interconnect the Ad-Hoc network to the legacy network
to construct an Extended SDN domain (Fig. 3). Moreover,
as all controllers of the extended SDN domain are in equal
interaction, all rules will be synchronized.
In a most recent work like [7], the SDN domain is limited to
the network with infrastructure. In this conﬁguration, Ad-Hoc
users have to connect through other nodes (Network gateway)
directly connected to the SDN domain. In our proposed archi-
tecture, the SDN domain is extended in order to include all
Ad-Hoc devices. Our proposed solution consists of deploying
an OpenFlow software switch, such as Open vSwitch [3] in
each Ad-Hoc node. This conﬁguration enables Ad-Hoc nodes
to connect to the network as part of the SDN domain, so
we can apply the same security rules as for the SDN domain
users. As show in Figure 3, the proposed architecture supports
networks with or without infrastructure.
B. Distributed Ad-Hoc Control Plane
As each Ad-Hoc node has its own SDN controller, the
SDN control plane has to manage the evolution of each SDN
virtual switch on each Ad-Hoc device. When a new Ad-Hoc
device connects itself or leaves the network, we can have many
exchanged messages in order to synchronize all the rules. In
order to ensure scalability and fault tolerance, a distributed
SDN architecture is preferred, with multiple controllers as
in [8]. To ensure that, we dynamically add new controllers
to the Ad-Hoc network area and authorize special nodes to
run control operation, as illustrated in Figure 4. The new
controllers will share the same network global view. However,
their functions and SDN management domain will be limited
to a small Ad-Hoc area. Furthermore those controllers will
be responsible for monitoring the behavior of the software
switches, since they are deployed at the user side.
Our proposed distributed network access control architec-
ture enables faster response to network changes. Moreover, it
Fig. 4. Distributed Ad-Hoc Control Plane.
reacts to attacks occurring in the SDN extended domain, while
sharing the trafﬁc load management with the root controller.
As mentioned earlier, control functions of Ad-Hoc controllers
will be limited and adapted to the available resources of the
hosting Ad-Hoc device. We intend to extend the SDN domain
even more, to include smart object like: tablets, smart phones,
mobile vehicles, etc. by developing a framework that integrates
OpenFlow software switches into those devices.
IV. SDN BASED ARCHITECTURE FOR IOT
The traditional network protocols and equipment are not
designed to support high levels of scalability, high amounts of
trafﬁc and mobility. Some authors [15] have proposed archi-
tecture for IoT but to the best of our knowledge. Besides, there
exits some papers [20], [21] of software-deﬁned approach for
the IoT environment, but it don’t propose security mechanism
for Ad-hoc network.
A. SDN Domain
In IoT or in sensor networks, each device cannot have an
embedded SDN compatible switch and an SDN controller
as we have proposed in the previous section. But, we can
assume that each device, with low resource can be associated
to one neighbor node which has the SDN capability. In a
heterogeneous network as in Figure 3 we have two types of
nodes in a domain. If the node has enough of resources, we
called it an OF node and if not, we called it a sensor or a smart
object. Each domain has its SDN controller which control all
trafﬁc in its domain.
B. SDN Domain interconnection
In the proposed architecture with multiple SDN domains,
we assume that in each domain, we have one SDN controller
or multiple SDN controllers. These controllers manage only
the device in its domain. A domain represents an enterprise
network or a datacenter.
An SDN-based architecture for the IoT requires heteroge-
neous interconnection with larges number of SDN domains.
In order to achieve such large scale interconnection, we
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Fig. 3. Extended SDN Domain.
introduce a new type of controller in each domain : the
root controller, that we can also called a Border controller.
Some authors [16], [17] propose hierarchical architecture for
SDN, to optimize and distribute control functions. We propose
not to distribute control functions on multiple controllers but
to distribute routing functions and security rules on each
border controller. Moreover these controllers are responsible
for establishing connections and exchanging information with
other SDN border controllers.
The development of this architecture is based on the per-
spective of equal interaction between controllers, using the
existing security mechanisms. Each SDN domain has its own
security policies and management strategy. To solve potential
problems raised by the heterogeneity of the security policies
respective to the interconnected SDN domains, we use the Grid
of Security concept proposed by Flauzac et al. in [18]. The
Grid of Security is a middleware for decentralized enforcement
of the network security.
V. DISTRIBUTED SDN SECURITY SOLUTION
The controller can not only manage the network, but also
monitors and efﬁciently secures the network against outside
and inside attacks.
Many works have studied network security using the SDN
architecture, either by implementing ﬁrewalls, IPS and IDS
modules on top of the SDN controller [4], [5], [6], or
by installing security policies into OpenFlow switches [2].
The emergence of the next generation Internet architecture,
requires even higher security levels, such as authenticating
network devices, users and objects connecting to users using
both wired and wireless technologies. Furthermore, we need to
monitor the behavior of both the users and the objects, estab-
lish trust boundaries, and use accounting methods along with
software veriﬁcation. However, existing security mechanisms
[2], [4], [5], [6] do not provide these security levels to meet
the security needs of next generation Internet architecture.
Inspired by existing Network Access Control and security
techniques [8], we design an extended secure SDN-based
architecture for the IoT. To explain our architecture, we ﬁrst
present a simple solution in which a controller manages the
security of one SDN domain. Second, we can extend this
ﬁrst solution to include multiple controllers with regard to the
available resources on each control platform. In addition, we
extend the distributed control architecture by interconnecting
all SDN domains via border controllers, which leads us close
to a secure model for the IoT.
Traditional Ad-Hoc architecture does not provide network
access control or global trafﬁc monitoring, due to the absence
of the network infrastructure. The architecture proposed in this
article overcomes those security limitations and enables dy-
namic network conﬁguration and security policies deployment.
Our purpose is to achieve maximum synchronization of
SDN Controllers in a security perimeter enabling a granular
control over network access and continuous monitoring of
network endpoints.
In order to secure network access and network resources, the
SDN controllers begin by authenticating the network devices.
Once the OpenFlow secure connection between the switch
and the controller is established, the controller blocks switch
ports directly connected to the users. After that, the controller
authorizes only user’s authentication trafﬁc. Once the user is
authenticated, and based on the authorization level of the user,
the controller will push the appropriate ﬂow entries to the
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Fig. 5. SDN Domain Interconnection.
software or the hardware access switch. In IoT, we extend
this authentication process to devices. Each device has to
associate itself with an OpenFlow enable node, each of which
is connected to one controller in their domain.
The whole concept of the grid of security network is to
extend the SDN domain concept to multiple domains (Fig. 6),
and each controller of each domain exchanges their security
rules. There are SDN controllers which behave as security
guards on the edge of the extended SDN Domain to ensure
the network safety. Safety connections between domains could
be provisioned and only added to SDN Controllers. Only
recognized trafﬁc could be accepted. The controllers know
policies in their domain but they don’t know policies of the
other domains. So, when a node wants to communicate with
another node of another domain, the ﬂow has to be forward to
the Security Controller, also called the Border Controller. The
security controller asks each neighbor controller if it knows
the destination of the information (Fig. 6).
There is further potential to exploit this architecture; with
a security controller in every domain, it can prevent users
opening unauthorized new services. Only services authorized
by controller can be used for endpoint devices. In order to
prevent one user initiating unauthorized communication with
another user, when one wants to open one a communication
port, he must make a request to the SDN controller. For
instance, assuming that one user or device wants to open a
web service, the ﬁrst task is to request to its controller to
determinate if a web service exists and can be opened on the
network. Then each border controller asks each controller of
each domain. If a such service exists on a device, then all
messages will be forward to this device.
Furthermore, the Extended SDN controllers periodically
monitor and check the ﬂow table entries of the software
switches because they are deployed on the user side. In the
proposed architecture, we deployed software switches on the
users side to enhance the forwarding capabilities of Ad-Hoc
devices. Moreover, the deployed software switches allow the
SDN controller to apply and enforce the security policies
inside the Ad-Hoc area.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article we proposed a new SDN based network ar-
chitectures with distributed controllers. Moreover, our solution
can be used in the context of Ad-Hoc network and IoT.
First, we presented a new architecture with multiple SDN
controllers in equal interaction. Second, we propose an ar-
chitecture which is scalable with multiple SDN domains. In
each domain we can have networks with or without infras-
tructure and each controller is responsible only for its domain.
The communications between domains is made with special
controllers called Border Controllers. The Border Controllers
have to work in a new distributed interaction in order to
guarantee the independence of each domain in case of failure.
We adopt an architecture to guarantee the security of the entire
network with the concept of grid of security embedded in each
controller to prevent attacks. We work to build this architecture
and test it in a real environments.
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Fig. 6. Grid of Security in SDN Domain.
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